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Telford: Casting Sunlight on Shadow Governments-
Limits to the Delegation of Government Power to
Associations of Officials and Agencies
Leslie L. Marshall*
A government by secrecy benefits no one. It injures the people
it seeks to serve, it injures its own integrity and operation. It
breeds mistrust, dampens the fervor of its citizens, and mocks
their loyalty.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The Telford2 case, little known to the public, may turn out to be
one of the most important cases in Washington State, protecting the
fundamental right of the public to know about, and control the actions
of, government officials and agencies.
Telford sheds light on, and begins to correct, the growing tenden-
cy of government agencies and officials to delegate power and transfer
public money to associations of officials and agencies. These associa-
tions, acting as agents for government officials and other agencies, take
actions officials themselves are not allowed to-in effect, becoming
super agencies. These tax-funded associations, claiming to be free of
public disclosure rules, antilobbying laws, open meeting law require-
ments, and one-person-one-vote constitutional restraints, have a sig-
* J.D. Candidate 2001, Seattle University School of Law; B.A. 1997, University of Wash-
ington. Thank you to my friends, colleagues, and the Seattle University Law Review editorial
board for their help and support. A special thanks to my family for their love, patience, and
thoughtful editing of numerous drafts.
1. S. REP. No. 89-813, at 10 (1965).
2. Telford v. Thurston County Bd. of Comm'rs, 95 Wash. App. 149, 974 P.2d 886 (1999),
review denied, 138 Wash. 2d 1015, 989 P.2d 1143 (1999).
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nificant, yet little noticed, potential to undermine basic democratic
principles.
Increasingly, state government officials and agencies are delegat-
ing power to associations that set policies, pass resolutions, lobby, take
legal positions in court, and use public funds in political campaigns
and on ballot measures. The executive directors and others who run
these associations are not elected by the public and are mostly
unknown to the public. In many respects they now form an unac-
countable, powerful, and mostly invisible new branch of government:
shadow governments.
Representative democracy depends on the ability of the people to
hold their elected officials accountable for governmental actions, but
when officials give public funds and delegate state powers to unelected
associations, it becomes extraordinarily difficult for voters to deter-
mine whom to hold accountable.
In Washington State, the Public Disclosure Act3 and the Open
Public Meetings Act,4 which are sometimes collectively referred to as
the Sunshine Laws, 5 open government agencies to full public view and
prohibit contributions to ballot measures and political campaigns by
government agencies. The use of associations by state government
officials and agencies for political purposes inevitably collides with the
principles underlying the Sunshine Laws and similar limitations de-
signed to protect representative democracy. 6
In order to enforce the laws meant to protect public trust in gov-
ernment, the Telford court began to cast sunlight on these shadow
governments. Telford, however, should be the start, not the end, of a
principled review of how to bring associations of public officials and
agencies "into the sunshine of public accountability."7
3. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17 (1998). See generally Servais v. Port of Bellingham, 127
Wash. 2d 820, 826, 904 P.2d 1124, 1127 (1995) ("The Public Disclosure Act mandates disclo-
sure in four areas of government, namely: campaign financing; lobbyist reporting; reporting of
elected officials' financial affairs; and public records.").
4. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.30 (1998).
5. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) ("Sunlight is said to be the best of dis-
infectants; electric light, the most efficient policeman." (quoting L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEO-
PLE'S MONEY 62 (1933)); Cathcart v. Andersen, 85 Wash. 2d 102, 108, 530 P.2d 313, 316
(1975) (noting the appropriate dubbing by Florida of its open meeting act as a Sunshine Law).
6. See generally Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 1231 (1994) (arguing that the modem administrative state openly supports important
structural precepts of the American constitutional order).
7. Plaintiff's Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 17, Telford v. Thurston
County Bd. of Comm'rs, No. 96-2-04116-2 (Wash. Supr. Ct. Thurston County, Oct. 29, 1997)
(on file with the Seattle University Law Review) (hereafter Plaintiffs Summary Judgment Brief].
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This Note engages in three areas of analysis. Part II reviews the
case of Telford v. Thurston County Board of Commissioners,' which, for
the first time in Washington State, confronted the issue of whether
associations of state officials or agencies are the equivalent of agencies
for purposes of the state Public Disclosure Act.
Part III examines the broader implications of Telford: (1) whe-
ther the principles in Telford should be applied to other state safe-
guards and restrictions on government agencies, such as the state
Open Public Meetings Act, (2) whether the constitutional requirement
of one-person-one-vote should be applied to associations of officials
that pass resolutions, lobby, and spend tax funds on political causes,9
and (3) whether associations of officials and agencies are the equiva-
lent of agencies, acting as "shadow governments,"1 doing indirectly
what public agencies cannot do directly, and thereby avoiding public
accountability.
Part IV discusses whether the legislature has allowed the delega-
tion of too much power and whether it should (1) restrict associations
of government officials or agencies to narrowly defined, nondiscretion-
ary information activities, and (2) open these associations to more
effective public disclosure requirements than those provided in exist-
ing law, such as a requirement that all association activity be placed on
publicly available Internet sites-an Internet Sunshine Law.
II. THE TELFORD CASE
A. The Allegations
On November 21, 1996, Paul Telford, a retired engineer and
private citizen, sued the Thurston County Board of Commissioners,
the Washington State Association of Counties (WSAC), and the
Washington Association of County Officials (WACO), alleging that
they illegally used taxpayer money on two separate ballot measures,
illegally contributed to political campaigns, and illegally refused to
disclose information about their activities. 1 Specifically, Mr. Telford
alleged that WACO spent $17,000 to oppose Initiative 1-559, a prop-
erty-tax reduction initiative,1 2 and that WSAC spent $1,500 to sup-
8. 95 Wash. App. 149, 974 P.2d 886 (1999).
9. See Cunningham v. Municipality of Metro. Seattle, 751 F. Supp. 885 (W.D. Wash.
1990).
10. Rob Eure, Appeals Court Sends Trade Groups for Counties Into an Identity Crisis, WALL
ST. J., June 16, 1999, at NW1 (quoting Shawn Newman, president of Citizens for Leaders with
Ethics and Accountability NOW).
11. Plaintiffs Summary Judgment Brief, supra note 7, at 15-17.
12. Id. at 16. See also Eure, supra note 10, at NW1 ("Mr. Telford especially took issue
2000]
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port a referendum to increase taxes on alcohol, tobacco, and soda
syrup." He alleged that the staffs of WSAC and WACO worked on
the ballot measures using association facilities. 4 He further alleged
that WSAC donated $1,000 to the Senate Democratic Caucus, the
House Democratic Caucus, the Senate Republican Caucus, and the
House Republican Organizing committee."
Mr. Telford requested a declaratory judgment and injunctive
relief, asserting that the two associations were "agents of the Thurston
County Commissioners and ... therefore subject to the prohibitions
on using public funds to promote or oppose a ballot issue or other
political activities pursuant to [the Public Disclosure Act]. '"16 He
maintained that the court should order WACO and WSAC to comply
with (1) prohibitions on the use of funds or facilities in campaigns, (2)
the Open Records Act, (3) the Open Public Meetings Act, and (4)
state audits. 17
Mr. Telford summarized his allegations as follows:
County officials have authorized, through WSAC and WACO,
the use of public funds (and publicly paid-for facilities and staff)
in campaigns. Defendants have exploited a loophole to eviscer-
ate the intent of the state's Sunshine Laws. County Officials
have used the Associations as alter egos to do indirectly what the
officials cannot do directly.' 8
B. The State Public Disclosure Act
The Public Disclosure Act was enacted in 1972 as Initiative
276.19 This Washington State citizen's initiative was designed to keep
citizens informed so they could maintain control over government and
hold it accountable.2" "It prohibits the contribution of public funds to
political campaigns and lobbying efforts, mandates reports of public
officials' financial affairs, and requires disclosure of public records."2
with the effort to defeat the property-tax measure: 'Here is a statewide initiative, placed on the
ballot by voters who are trying to control government spending, and the governments are using
tax dollars to try to defeat it."').
13. Plaintiffs Summary Judgment Brief, supra note 7, at 15.
14. Telford v. Thurston County Bd. of Comm'rs, No. 96-2-04116-2, at 17 (Wash. Supr.
Ct. Thurston County, Oct. 29, 1997) (mem.) (on file with the Seattle University Law Review).
15. Id. at 15.
16. See id. 1-2.
17. Id. at 17.
18. Id. at 16.
19. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.010 (1998).
20. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.251 (1998). See § 42.17.010(5) ("That public confidence in
government at all levels is essential and must be promoted by all possible means.").
21. Telford v. Thurston County Bd. of Comm'rs, 95 Wash. App. 149, 158, 974 P.2d 886
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Washington's Public Disclosure Act, known as the PDA, pro-
vides that the people, not government agencies, will decide what the
public has the right to know.
The people of this state do not yield their sovereignty to the
agencies that serve them. The people, in delegating authority,
do not give their public servants the right to decide what is good
for the people to know and what is not good for them to know.
The people insist on remaining informed so that they may main-
tain control over the instruments that they have created.22
Despite the inconvenience or embarrassment that disclosing
information may create for a public agency, it is the policy behind the
statute that open examination and disclosure of public records is in the
interest of the public.23  Under the PDA's strong policy in favor of
disclosure, agencies must respond quickly to citizens, and the courts
must fine agencies that have wrongfully denied information to citi-
zens.24  Agencies have a duty to provide "the fullest assistance to
inquirers and the most timely possible action on requests for informa-
tion. ' 2' Also, under the PDA, public agencies may not use public
funds for campaigns,26 use public facilities for political campaigns,27 or
engage in unregulated lobbying. 28
891 (1999).
22. WASH. REV. CODE§ 42.17.251 (1998).
23. Julie E. Markley, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse: Newman v. King County and
Washington's Freedom of Information Law, 73 WASH. L. REV. 1107, 1113 (1998) (citing WASH.
REV. CODE § 42.17.340(3) (1998)). "Courts shall take into account the policy of this chapter that
free and open examination of public records is in the public interest, even though such examina-
tion may cause inconvenience or embarrassment to public officials or others." Concerned Rate-
payers Ass'n v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1, 138 Wash. 2d 950, 957, 983 P.2d 635, 639 (1999)
(citing WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.340(3) and stating that to fulfill the statutory purpose, the
Act's disclosure provisions will be liberally construed and the exemptions narrowly construed).
24. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.320 (1998) (requiring an agency to respond to requests for
public records within five business days and if a request is denied, mandating agency review of
the decision within two business days of denial).
25. WASH. REV. CODE§ 42.17.290 (1998).
26. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.128 (1998). "Public funds, whether derived through taxes,
fees, penalties, or any other source, shall not be used to finance political campaigns for state or
local office." Id.
27. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.130 (1998). "No elective official nor any employee of his
office nor any person appointed to or employed by any public office or agency may use or
authorize the use of any of the facilities of a public office or agency, directly or indirectly, for the
purpose of assisting a campaign for election of any person to any office or for the promotion of or
opposition to any ballot proposition." Id. "Facilities of a public office or agency" may include
use of stationery, postage, machines, vehicles, office space, employees during working hours,
publications of the agency, and clientele lists. Id. The provisions in RCW 42.17.130 do not
apply to activities that are part of the normal and regular conduct of the office or agency. Id.
28. WASH. REV. CODE§ 42.17.190 (1998).
(3) Any agency, not otherwise expressly authorized by law, may expend public funds
Seattle University Law Review
In Washington State, an agency is generally defined as any state
or local agency.
"State agency" includes every state office, department, division,
bureau, board, commission, or other state agency. "Local agen-
cy" includes every county, city, town, municipal corporation,
quasi-municipal corporation, or special purpose district, or any
office, department, division, bureau, board, commission, or
agency thereof, or other local agency.29
Most state laws define "agency" in broad terms, such as any state
or other governmental entity performing a governmental function for
the state or any one or more municipalities thereof.3 ° Further, the
Washington Administrative Code defines "agent" as used in RCW
chapter 42.17 (the PDA) as:
a person, whether the authority or consent is direct or indirect,
express or implied, oral or written who: (1) Is authorized by
another to act on his or her behalf; or (2) Represents and acts for
another with the authority or consent of the person represented;
or (3) Acts for or in place of another by authority from him or
her.31
These provisions of the PDA are liberally construed to cast as
broad a net as possible in favor of disclosure.32
In Telford, the question before the superior court and before the
court of appeals was whether WSAC and WACO were "public agen-
for lobbying, but such lobbying activity shall be limited to (a) providing information
or communicating on matters pertaining to official agency business to any elected offi-
cial or officer or employee of any agency or (b) advocating the official position or
interests of the agency to any elected official or officer or employee of any agency:
PROVIDED, That public funds may not be expended as a direct or indirect gift or
campaign contribution to any elected official or officer or employee of any agency.
For the purposes of this subsection, the term "gift" means a voluntary transfer of any
thing of value without consideration of equal or greater value, but does not include
informational material transferred for the sole purpose of informing the recipient
about matters pertaining to official agency business. This section does not permit the
printing of a state publication, which has been otherwise prohibited by law.
§ 42.17.190(3).
29. WASH. REV. CODE§ 42.17.020(1) (1998).
30. Various private and nonprofit entities with governmental affiliations, as well as certain
independent authorities, though not without exception, have been held to constitute agencies
subject to the provisions of the particular state's freedom of information law on the basis that
such entities either acted on behalf of a governmental agency or were so involved in governmen-
tal functions that they fell within the scope of the act. Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation, What Con-
stitutes an Agency Subject to Application of State Freedom of Information Act, 27 A.L.R. 4th 742,
746 (1984).
31. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 390-05-190 (1999).
32. See Nadel, supra note 30, at 746; Burt A. Braverman & Wesley R. Heppler, A Practical
Review of State Open Records Laws, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 720 (1981).
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cies" under the PDA. As is discussed in more detail below, both
courts concluded that these associations were essentially "shadow gov-
ernments" comprised of public officials conducting public business
with public funds while claiming the right to refuse disclosure of their
actions to the public and the right to refuse to be bound by the prohi-
bitions on political activities that apply to government agencies.
C. Facts Not in Dispute
The superior court, in a 38-page opinion, reviewed the facts pre-
sented by Mr. Telford and the associations. Because both Telford and
the associations moved for summary judgment, several facts were not
in dispute, including the following:
(1) WSAC's members are solely the counties of the State of
Washington; (2) WACO's members are solely elected or appointed
county officials; (3) WSAC and WACO are funded almost entirely
from public funds, which were raised through taxes and passed on to
them in the form of dues paid by counties or county officials; (4)
WACO contributed $41,648.24 in cash and in-kind contributions to
oppose Initiative 559 on the ballot in 1992; (5) WSAC contributed
$1,000 to political parties in 1993 and made campaign contributions of
at least $1,500 to support the passage of Referendum 43 on the ballot
in 1994; and (6) WSAC used employees, staff, offices, and facilities to
campaign for the passage of Referendum 43 on the ballot in 1994."3
The court of appeals agreed that several key facts were not in dis-
pute, including the following: (1) "Both WSAC and WACO are
completely controlled by elected and appointed county officials."34 (2)
"Most of WSAC and WACO's income is derived from annual dues
paid by its members. The dues are based upon each association's
operating budget and a formula related to the population of each
member county. '31 (3) WSAC and WACO contributed funds to bal-
lot measures and used staff and facilities to defeat or support ballot
measures. 36
33. Telford, No. 96-04116-2 at 16-17 (Wash. Supr. Ct. Thurston County, Oct. 29, 1997)
(mem.). In a footnote, the court noted that at oral argument Mr. Telford believed the sum con-
tributed to oppose Initiative 559 was $16,800. Id. at 17. WACO disputed the finding of fact on
appeal, arguing that it contributed only $16,980.30 to the initiative and the remainder to other
lobbying activities. Telford v. Thurston County Bd. of Comm'rs, 95 Wash. App. 149, 166 n.25,
974 P.2d 886, 895 (1999).
34. Telford, 95 Wash. App. at 155, 974 P.2d at 890.
35. Id.
36. Id.
2000]
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D. The Legal Argument in Telford
WSAC and WACO argued that they are private, nonprofit cor-
porations, and thus should not be considered an "agency" under the
PDA. They
argue[d] that WSAC and WACO are private corporations, and
though recognized by the legislature are not created by it. They
argue[d] that any funds they receive are simply for their services
to counties or county officials and become their private funds
upon receipt the same as any other private company who sells
services to government.37
No provisions in the PDA specifically speak to agencies that
have the form of a private corporation or to whether the term"agency" is meant to encompass associations of officials or agencies.
As a result, the legal issue in Telford involved legislative intent: are
associations of agencies intended to be included within the term"agency" under the PDA?
Telford argued that WACO and WSAC, as associations of pub-
lic officials, should be allowed to do only what an official is allowed to
do under the PDA.3" He argued that the intent of the PDA and its
language as a whole mandates this result.39 Therefore, these associa-
tions should not be allowed to directly or indirectly assist any election
campaign, promote or oppose any ballot proposition, 40 use public
funds to help finance political campaigns, or give public funds to any
elected official, officer, or employee of any agency.
42
37. Telford, No. 96-04116-2 at 19 (Wash. Supr. Ct. Thurston County, Oct. 29, 1997)
(mem.). See Washington State Association of County Commissioners 1939 Wash. Laws 188
(WSAC). The acts that empowered the several counties to pay public funds to WSAC and
WACO identify the associations as coordinating agencies.
38. Respondent's Brief at 7, Telford v. Thurston County Bd. of Comm'rs, 95 Wash. App.
149, 974 P.2d 886 (1999) (No. 32559-51) (on file with the Seattle University Law Review). See
WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.130 (1998) ("No elective official nor any employee of his office nor
any person appointed to or employed by any public office or agency may use or authorize the use
of any of the facilities of a public office or agency, directly or indirectly for the purpose of assisting
a campaign for election of any person to any office or for the promotion of or opposition to any
ballot proposition.") (emphasis added) ("Public funds, whether derived through taxes, fees, pen-
alties, or any other source, shall not be used to finance political campaigns."); WASH. REV.
CODE § 42.17.190(3)(1998) ("[p]ublic funds may not be expended as a direct or indirect gift or
campaign contribution to any elected official or officer or employee of any agency."); WASH.
REV. CODE § 42.17.128 (1998) (stating that facilities of a public office may or may not be used to
support or oppose an initiative to the legislature); WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.190(4) (1998)
(defining facilities of a public office or agency as the same as in RCW 42.17.130).
39. Respondent's Brief, supra note 38 at 5.
40. See§ 42.17.130.
41. See§ 42.17.128.
42. See§ 42.17.190(3).
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The associations, WSAC and WACO, said the plain language
rule should apply in interpreting the statute. 3 WSAC/WACO point-
ed to the rule in Senate Republican Campaign Committee v. Public Dis-
closure Commission," stating that "[w]here the meaning of a statutory
term adopted by initiative is clear, there is no need to glean the intent
of the people from sources other than the statute itself."4 The associ-
ations argued that the specific definition of "agency" under the Public
Disclosure Act does not encompass entities such as WSAC or
WACO.4 6 Further, because the statutory definition "controls its
interpretation, '47 there is no need to analyze the application of the
term "agency" in the PDA as it applies to "hybrid entities" or to"quasi-public agencies." 48
WSAC and WACO also maintained that the legislative history
of the PDA supports its strict application.49 The associations argued
that the Legislature had two opportunities to amend the definition of"agency" within the PDA and opted not to do so. They claimed that
the failure to amend the definition to encompass associations illus-
trates the legislature's satisfaction with the narrow meaning of agen-
cy:"o "This strong indication of legislative satisfaction with the plainly
43. Brief of Appellants at 12, Telford v. Thurston County Bd. of Comm'rs, 95 Wash.
App. 149, 974 P.2d 886 (1999) (No. 23559-5-II) (on file with the Seattle University Law Review).
"If the Legislature or the people wish to broaden the statute to include within the statute's reach
individuals who have not taken the steps outlined in the current statutory definition of candidate,
that can easily be accomplished by amendment. It is not appropriate, however, for this court to
broaden the statute beyond its plain terms." Senate Republican Campaign Comm. v. Public
Disclosure Comm'n, 133 Wash. 2d 229, 245, 943 P.2d 1358, 1366 (1997); See also Associated
Gen. Contractors of Wash. v. King County, 124 Wash. 2d 855, 865, 881 P.2d 966, 1001 (1994)
("[Clourts may not create legislation in the guise of interpreting it.").
44. Senate Republican Campaign Comm., 133 Wash. 2d 229, 943 P.2d. 1358 (1997).
45. Rebuttal of Respondent's Brief, Telford v. Thurston County Bd. of Comm'rs at 6-7,
95 Wash. App. 149, 974 P.2d 886 (1999) (No. 23559-5-11) (on file with the Seattle University
Law Review).
46. Brief of Appellants, supra note 43, at 11-12. (arguing that none of the terms of RCW
42.17.010 suggest that the policy of the PDA is to expand the definition of "agency" to reach
entities other than those specifically referred to in RCW 42.17.020(1)).
47. State v. Morris, 77 Wash. App. 948, 950, 896 P.2d 81, 82 (1995) (citing City of Seattle
v. Shepherd, 93 Wash. 2d 861, 866, 613 P.2d 1158 (1980)).
48. Rebuttal of Respondent's Brief, supra note 45, at 1-3.
49. Brief of Appellants, supra note 43, at 13 (noting that the legislature has made precise
references to organizations like WSAC and WACO elsewhere, for example, in RCW
41.40.010(1). Although the legislature has used the term "associations of political subdivisions"
to refer to organizations such as WSAC and WACO in the past, those terms are conspicuously
absent from RCW 42.17.020(1)). Id.
50. "Since 1972, when the PDA was adopted by the passage of Initiative 276,.... the
Legislature has amended the definition of 'agency' twice without expanding it to encompass
associations of political subdivisions like WSAC and WACO." Rebuttal of Respondent's Brief,
supra note 45, at 2-3.
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narrow meaning of 'agency' should not be disturbed by judicial
interpretation."51
E. The Superior Court Decision
The superior court, rejecting the associations' argument, found
that regardless of any opportunity for the legislature to amend the
definition of agency, the PDA attempted to include every possible
entity of interest in the definition of "agency," and as such should be
read broadly. "It is hard to imagine a broader definition since the
statute is meant to encompass all agencies, state and local, including
even quasi-municipal corporations. '"52 The superior court then looked
to the overall purpose of the statute for guidance on whether associa-
tions such as WSAC and WACO were "agencies" under the PDA.
The superior court held that the intent of the PDA is found within the
statute's declaration of policy. That policy states that the representa-
tive form of government is founded on a belief that public officials
have nothing to fear from full public disclosure of their business as
long as they deal honestly and fairly with the people.53
The PDA emphasizes that public confidence "is essential and
must be protected by all possible means," 4 and this confidence can be
sustained by "assuring the people of the impartiality and honesty of
the officials in all public transactions and decisions."55 The superior
court emphasized the PDA's declaration of policy, which states that
"[tjhe provisions of this chapter shall be liberally construed."5 6
The superior court also examined a 1995 United States Supreme
Court decision, Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation,7
which held that Amtrak was an agency of the United States. 8 Sum-
marizing the principles in Lebron, the superior court said, "Even with
such express denial, however, some of these instrumentalities or
agency corporations have been found to be agencies of the Govern-
ment for certain purposes despite the Government's denial that there
are such."59 Lebron used the functional equivalency test, which simply
51. Id.
52. Telford v. Thurston County Bd. of Comm'rs, No. 96-2-04116-2, at 29 (Wash. Supr.
Ct. Thurston County, Oct. 29, 1997) (mem.).
53. WASH. REV. CODE§ 42.17.010 (1998).
54. § 42.17.010(5).
55. § 42.17.010(6) (emphasis added).
56. Telford, No. 96-04116-2 at 28 (quoting RCW § 42.17010).
57. Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995).
58. Id. at 394.
59. Telford, No. 96-04116-2 at 21. See also, Cherry Cotton Mills, Inc., v. United States,
327 U.S. 536 (1946). The Court in Cherry Cotton found that the Reconstruction Funding Cor-
poration was an agency selected by the government to accomplish purely governmental purposes.
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means that no matter what an association or entity is called, the test
will be based on what the association or entity does-its functions. If
its functions are equivalent to those of a public agency, then the asso-
ciation or entity will be regulated by laws limiting public agencies.
F. The Court of Appeals Decision: When Are Associations of Officials
and Agencies the Functional Equivalent of Government Agencies Under
the Public Disclosure Act?
1. Introduction
The court of appeals reviewed the PDA's strong mandate for
public accountability of public agencies6" and considered when an
association of government officials is the equivalent of an "agency"
under the PDA.61 The Telford courts were the first Washington State
courts to address this question.
Federal courts and courts in other states, answering similar ques-
tions, have developed a functional equivalency test that compares the
amount of an entity's public activity to its private activity to determine
whether the activities of an association are more public or private.62
When the activities tip toward the public side of the balance, the
courts have found associations to be "agencies," and therefore, subject
to the limitations that apply to regular public agencies.
In Telford, the court of appeals looked to the four factors of the
functional equivalency test articulated in Board of Trustees of Wood-
stock Academy v. Freedom of Information Commission.63 "The major
and discrete criteria which federal courts have utilized in employing a
"Its Directors are appointed by the President and affirmed by the Senate; its activities are all
aimed at accomplishing a public purpose; all of its money comes from the Government; its prof-
its if any go to the Government; its losses the government must bear. That the Congress chose
to call it a corporation does not alter its characteristics so as to make it something other than what
it actually is .... " Id. at 539.
60. Telford, 95 Wash. App. 149, 158-59, 974 P.2d 886, 891-92 (quoting RCW 42.17.010
that the Act's provisions are to be "liberally construed to promote complete disclosure of all
information respecting the financing of political campaigns and lobbying, and the financial
affairs of elected officials and candidates, and full access to public records. .. "). See
WASH.REV.CODE § 42.17.920 (1998).
61. Telford, 95 Wash. App. at 156-57, 974 P.2d at 890-91.
62. See generally Railway Labor Executive's Ass'n v. Consolidated Rail Corp. 580 F. Supp.
777, 778-79 (D.D.C. 1984); Connecticut Humane Soc'y v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 591 A.2d
395, 396-97 (Conn. 1991); Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. Insurance Dept. of New
York, 532 N.Y.S.2d. 186, 189 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998).
63. 436 A.2d 266, 270-71 (Conn. 1980). In Telford, the court also noted that the state of
Oregon recently extended the equivalency test set forth in Woodstock Academy by identifying six
factors the court should take into consideration. However, the Oregon court states that these six
factors are not intended to be exclusive. Any factor bearing on the character of the entity and
that entity's relationship with government may be relevant.
2000]
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functional equivalent test are: (1) whether the entity performs a gov-
ernmental function; (2) the level of government funding; (3) the extent
of government involvement or regulation; and (4) whether the entity
was created by the government."64  Formalistic arguments that an
entity is a nonprofit organization are usually rejected by the courts as
nondeterminative. Rather, courts look at substance over form due to
the existence of a myriad of organizational arrangements for accom-
plishing government business.65 Therefore, the particular form chosen
by an organization is never the test. The configuration of each factor
in relationship to the overall context where the issue arises reveals the
essential nature of the entity for that particular context. It is possible
for the same agency to be private in one context and public in
another.66 Straining specific facts through the sieve of the functional
equivalency test, the essential nature of the entities becomes more
certain.
In addition to holding that all four parts of the functional
equivalency test do not need be satisfied in order for an entity to fall
under the public disclosure laws, courts have also held that private
entities with government affiliations are subject to Sunshine Laws.67
In several cases, notwithstanding the private character of the entities
involved, courts have held that even private entities may constitute
agencies subject to the provisions of the particular state's freedom of
information act. In these cases, the courts required public disclosure
of the entities' records on the grounds that such entities either acted on
behalf of a governmental agency or were so involved in government
functions that they came within the scope of disclosure acts.6"
64. Woodstock Academy, 436 A.2d at 270.
65. Id.
66. Nadel, supra note 30, at 754-57. Various private and nonprofit entities with
governmental affiliations, as well as certain independent authorities, though not without excep-
tion, have been held to constitute agencies subject to the provisions of the particular state's
freedom of information law on the basis that such entities either acted on behalf of a govern-
mental agency or were so involved in governmental functions as to bring them within the scope
of the act. Id. at 747.
67. See, e.g., Weston v. Carolina Research and Dev. Found., 401 S.E.2d 161, 164 (S.C.
1991) (finding that a private foundation was a "public body" with respect to public access to
records because the foundation received public funds).
68. See, e.g., Schwartzman v. Merritt Island Volunteer Fire Dep't, 352 So. 2d 1230, 1231-
32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that a nonprofit volunteer fire department was an"agency" within the purview of the state public records act, pointing out that the volunteer fire
department was at the very least acting on behalf of a public agency); Fritz v. Norflor Constr.
Co. 386 So. 2d 899, 901 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that an engineering corporation was
an "agency" within the meaning of a statute requiring disclosure of public records because the
corporation performed services for the city relating to the treatment plant); Indianapolis Con-
vention & Visitors Ass'n, Inc. v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 577 N.E.2d 208 (Ind. 1991)
(holding that a city convention and visitors association, a private not-for-profit corporation that
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2. The Washington State Attorney General Opinion
In a 1991 opinion, the Washington State Attorney General used
the functional equivalency test to determine the definition of an"agency" under the Open Meetings Act and the Public Disclosure
Act." That opinion concluded that an organization is a state agency
for purposes of both the Public Disclosure Act and the Open Public
Meetings Act if it is the functional equivalent of a state agency. ° The
attorney general's office used a four-part analysis that examined71 (1)
whether the entity was created by government, (2) the extent of gov-
ernment involvement or regulation, (3) the level of government fund-
ing, and (4) whether the organization performed a government
function.7
Despite this opinion, the Washington State Attorney General,
relying more on form than substance, found WSAC to be a "private
organization" and decided not to enforce the PDA against WSAC
In a letter dated April 18, 1995, Senior Assistant Attorney General
James Pharris informed Mr. Telford that a "prior AGO found WSAC
to be a private corporation. ' 74  In a second letter dated January 4,
1996, Mr. Pharris acknowledged receipt of Mr. Telford's earlier letter
and again declined to take any action to enforce the PDA against
received revenue from both public and private sources, was a "public agency" within the mean-
ing of the Public Records Act where the association's admitted function was to generate revenue
through the hotel-motel tax and attract conventions to the city convention center and the city
stadium, therefore, providing benefits to public, and where the association was maintained and
supported by a public agency that was subject to the Public Records Act, and where moneys paid
by the agency to the association were public funds and were allocated monthly and not on fee-
for-services basis).
69. 1991 Op. Wash. Att'y Gen. No. 5 (deciding whether the Small Business Export
Finance Assistance Center (EAC) was an "agency" subject to both RCW 42.30 and RCW
42.17).
70. Id. at 4.
71. Id. at 6 (adopting the four-part test of Woodstock Academy, 436 A.2d at 270-71); Plain-
tiffs Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Brief, supra note 7, at 4. (citing Candoo
v. State of Washington, No. 94-2-04017-8, at 9-10 (Wash. Supr. Ct. Thurston County),
(applying the same functional equivalency test to an attorney retained by the Attorney General
for a specific case. The Honorable Judge Hicks found that the activities of the attorney met all of
the equivalency tests and he was in fact an agent of the state for purposes of public access to cer-
tain records. Judge Hicks stated that "To hold otherwise would create a window for Public
agencies to avoid the Public Disclosure Act."))
72. The unavoidable fact is that each new arrangement must be examined anew and in its
own context.
73. 1991 Op. Wash. Att'y Gen. No. 5 (citing Public Citizen Health Research Group v.
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 668 F.2d 537, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
74. Telford v. Thurston County Bd. of Comm'rs, No. 96-2-04116-2 at 6 (Wash. Supr. Ct.
Thurston County, Oct. 29, 1997) (mem).
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WSAC.75 The Attorney General's Office's decision to not apply the
PDA to WSAC set the stage for a judicial review.
3. Applying the Functional Equivalency Test in Telford
Although WSAC and WACO argued that they are private, non-
profit corporations,76 the court of appeals found that WSAC and
WACO were each the functional equivalent of a public agency.77
Both associations were created and controlled by public officials to
serve public purposes, and both are funded by public money.78 The
court of appeals based its conclusion on an examination of the four
factors of the functional equivalency test.
a. Performance of Governmental Functions
WSAC and WACO are associations of elected officials created
to assist each other in their duties and to coordinate their public
duties.79 WSAC and WACO were created by elected officials acting
in their public capacity in order to implement public duties 80 that
could not be delegated to the private sector. 81
WSAC and WACO argued that they are private corporations,
and relied on a 1969 informal memorandum from an Assistant Attor-
ney General to the State Auditor, which opined that because counties
were not compelled to belong to WSAC, it was private and thus could
spend money without limit on political causes and campaigns."
75. Id. Ironically, on the same date, January 4, 1996, Telford received a letter from the
executive directors of WSAC and WACO, Gary Lowe and Fred Seager, respectively, indicating
that the revenue for their associations derives from county government. Id. at 9.
76. Brief of Appellants, supra note 43, at 11.
77. Telford, 95 Wash. App. at 165, 974 P.2d at 895.
78. Id.
79. The bylaws of the Washington State Association of Counties were adopted on June 19,
1992, of which Article 2.2.2. states: "The membership of the Association shall be all duly
elected or appointed county commissioners, members of county councils, and county executives,
or the equivalent office in any county operating under a home rule charter." Plaintiffs Summary
Judgment Brieb, supra note 7, at 7.
80. The Act (Washington State Association of County Commissioners, 1939 Wash. Laws
188) "recognizes the public necessity of coordinating certain administrative functions of the sev-
eral counties, for the benefit of the individual counties and the state generally." State ex rel.
Cruikshank v. Baker, 2 Wash. 2d, 145, 153, 97 P.2d 638, 641 (1940) (emphasis added). The law
enacting WACO stated that: "It shall be the duty of the assessor, auditor, clerk, coroner, sheriff,
superintendent of schools, treasurer, prosecuting attorney of each county in the state to take such
action as they jointly deem necessary to effect the coordination of the administrative programs of
each county..." Counties - Coordination of Administrative Procedures, 1959 Wash. Laws ch.
130 § 2, (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 36.32.340).
81. Telford, 95 Wash. App. at 164, 974 P.2d at 894.
82. Brief of Appellants, supra note 43, at 28, (citing Memorandum to State Auditor, Robert
V. Graham, from Assistant Attorney General Robert F. Hauth, dated August 28, 1969. This
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WSAC and WACO asserted that because they do not directly regu-
late or govern, and because they are simply service providers, they are
not the functional equivalent of an agency. Direct regulation, how-
ever, is not the only method by which public agencies make public
policy. Public policy is also made by public agencies adopting resolu-
tions, lobbying for legislation, influencing other agencies, litigating in
court, donating staff time and money to defeat or support ballot meas-
ures, publishing position papers, or endorsing political causes. The
court of appeals noted that WSAC and WACO are different from
contracted service providers because dues are paid to WASC and
WACO in lump sums at the beginning of the year before any services
are rendered."3 The character of the "services" are also of a political,
and thus governmental, nature. In short, the associations acted as
agents for government officials and public policy issues.
b. The Level of Government Funding
Both WSAC and WACO charge their members dues or fees
based on each association's operating budget and on a formula related
to the population of each member county. 4 The member counties pay
their dues with public funds.8" Over ninety-five percent of WSAC's
and WACO's funds come from membership dues and fees. 6 Each
association, however, has some income from the sale of its joint direc-
tory and some income from conference and seminar registrations.8 7
WACO and WSAC consider that, once received, all county dues
become their private funds and are deposited into private bank
accounts.88 Therefore, they argue, the use of these funds is not
restricted. This argument would create a loophole that could be
exploited to launder public funds for unauthorized purposes. The
court did not support WSAC and WACO on this point: "[t]o allow
counties to allocate a block of public funds to be spent entirely at the
discretion of the associations as if the funds were private violates the
clear intent of the statutes." 89 These entities are completely controlled
by public officials acting in their public capacities. Since they are also
memorandum was not a formal published Attorney General Opinion).
83. Telford, 95 Wash. App. at 164, 974 P.2d at 894-95.
84. Telford, 95 Wash. App. at 155, 974 P.2d at 890.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 156, 974 P.2d at 890. The associations do not use governmental financing meth-
ods such as municipal bonds and they do not use the State Treasurer's investment pool for
deposit of their funds. Brief of Appellants supra note 43, at 8.
89. Telford, 95 Wash. App. at 164, 974 P.2d at 895.
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completely funded by public tax dollars, " these public officials con-
trolled public-funded activities and should be accountable as to how
those tax dollars are spent.
Similarly, the court of appeals considered and rejected as unavail-
ing the associations' argument that they issue their own checks for
payment of debts and use private accounting firms to review their
financial management methods and prepare their tax returns:9 "This
argument ignores that the dues are based upon an annual operating
budget and are paid before services are rendered.92 Furthermore, the
court of appeals found that the funding system employed by WSAC/
WACO contravenes the statutes allowing them to receive public
funds in the first instance. 93
c. The Extent of Governmental Control
Because the associations are controlled by county officials with-
out private sector involvement, the court of appeals held that the
degree of governmental control was sufficient to satisfy the third part
of the four-part-test:94 "[T]he associations themselves are completely
controlled by elected and appointed county officials."95
d. Whether the Entity Was Created by Government
WSAC and WACO were not directly created by the legislature.
They were created, however, by government officials to carry out pub-
lic sector business and are recognized by the legislature as "coordinat-
ing agencies. '"" In addition to WSAC's and WACO's enabling
statutes, the associations are mentioned in thirty-five statutes, which
impose additional "public" duties on them-none of which can be
delegated to the private sector.97 The additional duties include "con-
90. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 43, at 28 (citing Memorandum of Assistant Attor-
ney General, Robert F. Hauth to State Auditor Robert V. Graham (August 28, 1969) 6-7 and its
reference to State ex rel. Cruishank v. Baker, which recognized that WSAC was a long-existing
private organization that counties were authorized, but not compelled, to designate as a coordi-
nating agency and pay with the counties' public funds). See also Lebron v. National R.R. Pas-
senger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995) (quoting Inland Waterways Corp. v. Young, 309 U.S. 517
(1940)) (The Inland Court found, similar to the holding in Lebron, that the government is not
able to evade the "most solemn obligations in the constitution by simply resorting to the corpo-
rate form.").
91. Telford, 95 Wash. App. at 164, 974 P.2d at 894 (noting that WACO, however, is
audited by the State Auditor pursuant to RCW 36.47.060.).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 165, 974 P.2d at 895.
94. Id., 974 P.2d at 895.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 163-64 n.18, 974 P.2d at 894.
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suiting with state and county officials, appointing persons to state and
county boards and committees, and participating in various state
boards and commissions."98
G. The Conclusion in Telford
The court of appeals concluded,
Although WSAC and WACO retain some characteristics of
private entities, their essential functions and attributes are those
of a public agency.99 They serve a public purpose, are publicly
funded, are run by government officials, and were created by
government officials. I°
Applying the PDA to these facts, the court said, "[a]nalyzing
these factors in the context of the intent of the PDA and the other
relevant statutes reinforces the conclusion that the associations are
public. The PDA is to be construed broadly to promote disclosure
and accountability.""1 1 Allowing WSAC and WACO to use public
funds to support private political agendas would contravene both poli-
cies.1°2 Therefore, the court of appeals held that the trial court cor-
rectly ruled that WSAC and WACO are "agencies" for purposes of
the PDA. 1°3
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF TELFORD
A. Introduction
The implications of the Telford decision extend well beyond the
immediate question of whether two specific associations of govern-
ment officials are "agencies" for the purpose of the Public Disclosure
Act. Telford sheds light on, and begins to correct, the increasing ten-
dency of government officials and agencies to create associations that
then claim immunity from the rigorous constitutional and statutory
controls designed to protect the citizens' rights in a representative
democracy.
98. Id.
99. See also Dawson v. Daly, 120 Wash. 2d 782,789, 845 P.2d 995,999 (1993) (finding the
Snohomish County prosecutor's office an agency subject to the PDA); Overlake Fund v. City of
Bellevue, 60 Wash. App. 787, 810 P.2d 507 (1991) (finding a city's design and development
department a "local agency" for purposes of the public disclosure act).
100. Telford, 95 Wash. App. at 165, 974 P.2d at 895.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 166, 974 P.2d at 895.
103. Id.
20001
Seattle University Law Review
The public policy rationale of Telford extends to administrative
agencies that form associations of agencies in order to adopt positions,
lobby legislatures, and take positions in court. In particular, if agen-
cies can join with other public agencies to create and finance a new
agency with public money, but then call it an exempt association, they
have effectively delegated significant government power to an entity
insulated from public accountability. Associations of agencies have
been formed at the local, state, and national levels. While Congress
and state legislatures may delegate certain government functions and
powers to administrative agencies, there are important constitutional
and statutory limits to that delegation." 4
B. The Context: The Rise of the Administrative State and
Responses to Agency Power
Administrative agencies have long been subject to the criticism
that they are a political hazard to representational democracy, and
therefore must be subject to constant and careful legislative control
and supervision.'05 Constitutional purists opposed the idea that the
legislature could create administrative agencies, arguing that it would
be a dangerous and unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to
allow agencies to create and enforce government policies and adminis-
trative rules. Concern over the delegation of power to administrative
agencies increased in the 1930s, when administrative agencies became
so widespread that they became known as the new "fourth branch" of
government. 106
Under President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal administra-
tion of the 1930s and 1940s, administrative agencies were created at an
accelerated pace and were charged with the task of implementing vast
new economic and social programs.0 7 The New Deal era saw a dra-
104. See WILLIAM F. Fox, JR., UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 31-32 (3d ed.
1997).
105. See generally Lawson, supra note 6.
106. ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 1-4
(1992). See also Linda Greenhouse, Court Question: Is Congress Forsaking Authority?, N.Y.
TIMES, May 14, 2000, at L28. Since 1935, the nondelegation doctrine
has appeared little more than a historical footnote. It lingered as a quaint reminder of
a formalistic approach to the constitutional separation of powers, even as the modem
administrative state, with powerful regulatory agencies engaging in what often looks
very much like law-making, grew up around it. But while it disappeared from public
view. . . academics, lawyers for regulated industries, as well as the occasional judge,
who found a disturbing lack of political accountability in Congress's penchant for
shifting important policy choices to administrative agencies.
Id.
107. See FOX, supra note 104, at 34. See also LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 51-72 (1965); ERNST HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE
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matic shift in the American structure of governmental power, and the
number of federal agencies increased exponentially.' The rise of the
administrative state prompted Justice Jackson to warn that adminis-
trative agencies "[had] become a veritable fourth branch of the Gov-
ernment, which has deranged our three-branch legal theories." ' 9
In 1946, in partial response to concerns over agency power, Con-
gress enacted the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to govern the
procedures of agencies and set guidelines for and restrictions on
agency power."0 In 1966, the federal Freedom of Information Act was
added to the APA to provide public access to information held by
agencies. ' In 1976, the APA was again amended by the Sunshine
Act, further limiting agency power by opening agency actions to pub-
lic view."
As discussed above, in 1972, the citizens of Washington State
enacted the Public Disclosure Act, which applies to all agencies."'
C. Extension of Telford Beyond the Public Disclosure Act
The holding in Telford is limited to the Public Disclosure Act."4
Although application of the Open Public Meeting Act to WSAC and
PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY 19-34 (1966); AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 106, at 2-3 ("These
new agencies were largely involved in market regulation, (e.g., the Securities and Exchange
Commission) and in providing a new measure of personal economic security (e.g., the Social
Security Administration).").
108. AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 106, at 3 (citing Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger
Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 386, (1995)).
109. Id. at 3 n.9 (citing Federal Trade Commission v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487
(1952)). See also LAWSON, supra note 6, at 1233 ("Congress frequently delegates that general
legislative authority to administrative agencies, in contravention of Article I. Furthermore, those
agencies are not always subject to the direct control of the President, in contravention of Article
ii. In addition, those agencies sometimes exercise the judicial power, in contravention of Art.
III. Finally, those agencies typically concentrate legislative, executive, and judicial functions in
the same institution, in simultaneous contravention of Articles 1, 11, and III.").
110. This Act is codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 561-83, 701-06, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5372,
7521 (1946).
111. AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 106, at 6.
112. Some, like the Federal Records Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 29-33, define the kinds of records
that agencies must create and maintain. Disclosure statutes, like the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, specify the circumstances under which members of the public may
inspect those records, while 'confidentiality' statutes, such as the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. §
552a, or the Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905, specifically forbid disclosure of certain
kinds of records or information. Finally, there are 'open meeting' laws, like the pictur-
esquely titled Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b, that require certain
administrative business to be carried on in public sessions.
RONALD A. CASS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1129 (3d ed. 1998).
113. See discussion infra Part II.B.
114, Telford, 95 Wash. App. at 149, 974 P.2d at 886.
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WACO was not directly addressed in the decision, Telford should be
extended to laws similar to the PDA.
The Open Public Meetings Act of 1971,11 like the Public Dis-
closure Act, was created for the purpose of securing public account-
ability" 6 and it is to be liberally construed.117 The Open Public
Meeting Act requires all public agency meetings and deliberations be
held in public1 ' and broadly defines "public agency" as any sub-
agency, policy group, or governing body." 9 Public agencies must give
public notice of the time and place of their meetings in the state Regis-
115. WASH. REV. CODE§ 42.30 (1998).
116. WASH. REV. CODE§ 42.30.010 (1998).
It is the intent of this chapter that [public agency] actions be taken openly and that
their deliberations be conducted openly. The people of this state do not yield their
sovereignty to the agencies which serve them. The people, in delegating authority, do
not give their public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know
and what is not good for them to know. The people insist on remaining informed so
that they may retain control over the instruments they have created.
Id.
117. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.30.910 (1998). "The purposes of this chapter are hereby
declared remedial and shall be liberally construed." Id.
118. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.30.030 (1971). "All meetings of the governing body of a
public agency shall be open and public and all persons shall be permitted to attend any meeting
of the governing body of a public agency, except as otherwise provided in this chapter." Id.
119. WASH. REV. CODE§ 42.30.020 (1998).
(1) "Public agency" means:
(a) Any state board, commission, committee, department, educational institu-
tion, or other state agency which is created by or pursuant to statute, other
than courts and the legislature;
(b) Any county, city, school district, special purpose district, or other municipal
corporation or political subdivision of the state of Washington;
(c) Any subagency of a public agency which is created by or pursuant to statute,
ordinance, or other legislative act, including but not limited to planning
commissions, library or park boards, commissions, and agencies;
(d) Any policy group whose membership includes representatives of publicly
owned utilities formed by or pursuant to the laws of this state when meeting
together as or on behalf of participants who have contracted for the output of
generating plants being planned or built by an operating agency.
(2) "Governing body" means the multimember board, commission, committee, coun-
cil, or other policy or rule-making body of a public agency, or any committee
thereof when the committee acts on behalf of the governing body, conducts hear-
ings, or takes testimony or public comment.
(3) "Action" means the transaction of the official business of a public agency by a
governing body including but not limited to receipt of public testimony, delibera-
tions, discussions, considerations, reviews, evaluations, and final actions. "Final
action" means a collective positive or negative decision, or an actual vote by a
majority of the members of a governing body when sitting as a body or entity,
upon a motion, proposal, resolution, order, or ordinance.
(4) "Meeting" means meetings at which action is taken.
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trar and must give 20 days notice of any change in such scheduled
time or place. 2'
Any rule, regulation, order, or ordinance adopted in secret or in
violation of The Public Open Meeting Act is considered null and
void. 12' Any member who participates in a secret meeting will be held
personally liable, subject to a civil fine. 22 Furthermore, citizens may
120. WASH. REV. CODE§ 42.30.075 (1998).
State agencies which hold regular meetings shall file with the code reviser a schedule
of the time and place of such meetings on or before January of each year for publica-
tion in the Washington state register. Notice of any change from such meeting
schedule shall be published in the state register for distribution at least twenty days
prior to the rescheduled meeting date.
For the purposes of this section "regular" meetings shall mean recurring meetings
held in accordance with a periodic schedule declared by statute or rule.
Id. The time and place for meetings normally and in times of emergency is codified in RCW
42.30.070.
The governing body of a public agency shall provide the time for holding regular
meetings by ordinance, resolution, bylaws, or by whatever other rule is required for
the conduct of business by that body. Unless otherwise provided for in the act under
which the public agency was formed, meetings of the governing body need not be
held within the boundaries of the territory over which the public agency exercises
jurisdiction. If at any time any regular meeting falls on a holiday, such regular meet-
ing shall be held on the next business day. If, by reason of fire, flood, earthquake, or
other emergency, there is a need for expedited action by a governing body to meet the
emergency, the presiding officer of the governing body may provide for a meeting site
other than the regular meeting site and the notice requirements of this chapter shall be
suspended during such emergency. It shall not be a violation of the requirements of
this chapter for a majority of the members of a governing body to travel together or
gather for purposes other than a regular meeting or a special meeting as these terms
are used in this chapter: PROVIDED, That they take no action as defined in this
chapter.
WASH. REV. CODE § 42.30.070 (1998).
121. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.30.060 (1998).
(1) No governing body of a public agency shall adopt any ordinance, resolution, rule,
regulation, order, or directive, except in a meeting open to the public and then
only at a meeting, the date of which is fixed by law or rule, or at a meeting of
which notice has been given according to the provisions of this chapter. Any
action taken at meetings failing to comply with the provisions of this subsection
shall be null and void.
(2) No governing body of a public agency at any meeting required to be open to the
public shall vote by secret ballot. Any vote taken in violation of this subsection
shall be null and void, and shall be considered an "action" under this chapter.
Id. See Mason County v. Public Employment Relations Comm'n, Teamsters Union, Local No.
378, 54 Wash. App. 36, 771 P.2d 1185 (1989) (holding that the Open Public Meetings Act
applies to the collective bargaining sessions in which decision-making representatives participate
and that the public agency may not notify an agreement reached at meetings conducted in viola-
tion of the Act because the decision and agreement are void).
122. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.30.120 (1) (1998).
Each member of the governing body who attends a meeting of such governing body
where action is taken in violation of any provision of this chapter applicable to him,
with knowledge of the fact that the meeting is in violation thereof, shall be subject to
personal liability in the form of a civil penalty in the amount of one hundred dollars.
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attempt to enjoin123 the public agency and, if successful, will be
awarded all costs and attorneys fees. 24
While WSAC and WACO do not adopt rules or regulations,
they do pass resolutions, vote to participate in political campaigns,
vote to take positions in court, and otherwise influence government
affairs and spend taxpayer funds. Thus, WSAC and WACO should
give public notice of their meetings so that the public can participate
in the decision-making. Proceedings affecting the expenditures of
public funds that are closed to the public are not favored. If the
activities of WSAC and WACO are made public, they can be dis-
cussed and evaluated by the public.
Examples where public scrutiny may have caused agencies to
reconsider their decisions include recent actions taken by the Mercer
Island School district and the Blaine School district. In February
2000, the Mercer Island School district agreed to pay former superin-
tendent Paula Butterfield $194,000, or about 21 months salary, after
her termination. 125 Neither Butterfield nor the School Board gave rea-
sons for the agreement, and, when asked by The Seattle Times and the
Mercer Island Reporter for public information regarding the agree-
ment, instead of complying with the PDA, the School District sued
the two newspapers. The "[s]chool district's suit was a costly attempt
to thwart the people's right to know,"' 26 totaling over $10,000 for just
the Times case. 127
The civil penalty shall be assessed by a judge of the superior court and an action to
enforce this penalty may be brought by any person. A violation of this chapter does
not constitute a crime and assessment of the civil penalty by a judge shall not give rise
to any disability or legal disadvantage based on conviction of a criminal offense.
Id.
123. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.30.130 (1998). "Any person may commence an action either
by mandamus or injunction for the purpose of stopping violations or preventing threatened vio-
lations of this chapter by members of a governing body." Id.
124. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.30.120 (2) (1998).
Any person who prevails against a public agency in any action in the courts for a vio-
lation of this chapter shall be awarded all costs, including reasonable attorney fees,
incurred in connection with such legal action. Pursuant to RCW 4.84.185, any public
agency who prevails in any action in the courts for a violation of this chapter may be
awarded reasonable expenses and attorney fees upon final judgment and written
findings by the trial judge that the action was frivolous and advanced without reason-
able cause.
Id.
125. Michael R. Fisher, School District's Suit Was Costly Attempt to Thwart the People's
Right to Know, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 26, 2000.
126. Id.
127. Id. King County Superior Court Judge Steven Scott determined the district must
release documents that the Mercer Island Reporter required under the Washington Open Public
Records Act.
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Similarly, the Blaine school district spent $58,575 in taxpayer
dollars on a suit against the ACLU's request for information on the
district's 1995 suspensions. 128  The school district steadfastly refused
to mail 13 pages of public records) 29 The amount spent in litigation
costs would have been enough to "hire a teacher for a year and buy a
car for student drivers.0 30
If WSAC and WACO act as agents of officials, spending public
money for public policy purposes, their actions are the type of matter
open public meeting laws are intended to limit.
D. Should Telford Extend to Other Associations of Government
Officials or Agencies?
The immediate holding in Telford applies to just two associa-
tions, WSAC and WACO. Should the rationale of Telford apply to
other, similar associations? Should all associations of counties, cities,
ports, public hospitals, public utility districts, and administrative
agencies comply with the same laws that govern the officials and agen-
cies that create them?3 ' When government officials or agencies form
an association comprised of public officials and funded by public
monies, should the association be considered an extension-an agent
of the public entities it represents?
Other associations of agencies in Washington State were con-
cerned that the principles established in Telford would apply to them.
The Association of Washington Cities (AWC) intervened in Telford
and argued that the AWC engages in sensitive compensation research
for local governments in labor-contract negotiations. 32 The AWC
apparently hoped to avoid PDA disclosure requirements for this
research, even though the research is paid for by public funds and is
used for public purposes.
WSAC and WACO implied that if Sunshine Laws apply to
them, or to similar associations, the law may affect their ability to
compete with private corporations."3 Even if this is true, the legisla-
128. Scott Sunde, District's ACLU Tiff Costs It $58, 000, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Mar. 3, 2000, at Al. The amount paid is nearly $20,000 more than the average salary for the
district's teachers, librarians, and counselors, according to the Washington Education Associa-
tion. Id. at A4.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See Eure, supra note 10, at NW1 (presenting the opinion of Shawn Newman, presi-
dent of Citizens for Leaders with Ethics and Accountability Now).
132. Id.
133. Id. Stan Finkelstein, executive director of the Association of Washington Cities said,
"If we are a public agency, it would constrain our ability to be advocates to the same extent that
major corporations or business groups or labor unions are free to advocate." Mr. Lowe, executive
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ture should determine whether government agencies should compete
with private corporations. Full disclosure under the PDA is required
so that citizens can discover and debate the wisdom of a government
agency entering into competition with private sector businesses.
134
Washington State has had experience with state agencies, public
utility districts, and municipalities entering into the business of build-
ing nuclear power plants and failing, creating the largest municipal
bond default in United States history. t3 That association, once called
the Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS) has changed
its name but not its basic structure, which is governed by a collection
of state agencies.'36 In another recent example, the Washington
Association of Sheriff and Police Officers recently embarked on a side
business of electronic home monitoring. This once private industry is
now owned and operated by the association. When asked to provide
information regarding the basic structure of the business, the associa-
tion denied the request, stating that it was not a public agency. Upon
learning this, Paul Telford remarked, "these associations take up attri-
butes of both public and private-whatever suits them at the
moment."' 37
Numerous associations and councils in Washington State are
potentially subject to the rationale of the Telford decision.'38 These
associations of government officials and agencies should not resist the
principle of full disclosure, open meeting law requirements, and pro-
hibitions on involvement in political activities.
director of WSAC stated that "the strength of this organization is in the political strength of its
membership." Id. at NW3.
134. See Chemical Bank v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 102 Wash. 2d 874, 691
P.2d 524 (1984) (affirming that these public utility districts and municipalities had no authority
to enter into the bond contracts they made).
135. See D. VICTOR ANDERSON, ILLUSIONS OF POWER: A HISTORY OF THE
WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM (WPPSS) (1985).
136. See Northwest Energy (formerly WPPSS) <http://www.whp2.com/default.htm>.
137. Telephone Interview with Paul Telford (Mar. 13, 2000).
138. For example, those potentially affected include Washington State Bar Association,
Washington Association of Cities, Washington City Management Association, Association of
District and Municipal Court Judges, Washington State Hospital Association, Washington State
Law Enforcement Association, Northwest Public Power Association, Washington Public Ports
Association, Washington State Association of Prosecuting Attorneys, Washington Association of
Public Utility Districts, Washington Association of School Administrators, and Washington
State School Director's Association.
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E. Constitutional Implications of Telford-the
One-Person- One- Vote Issue
"[T]he right to choose a representative is every man's portion of
sovereign power.""'
The one-person-one-vote principle of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is a basic principle of represen-
tative government."' "The fundamental premise of the federal voting
rights law is that democratic government is government by the con-
sent of the governed."'' Therefore, votes of citizens are to be given
equal weight: "[n]o person's vote may be reduced in value, compared
to the votes of others, because of where he or she happens to live in the
electoral district. "142
Thirty-two years ago, the Supreme Court extended the one-per-
son-one-vote requirement to local governments in Avery v. Midland
County.'43 The Avery court rejected the argument that localities are
mere administrative arms of the state and not autonomous govern-
ments. 4 4 The Avery Court also rejected the argument that the county
commissioners court's legislative functions were negligible and there-
fore distinguishable from those of a state legislature. 4 Like Telford,
the Avery Court looked to the commissioners court's function and
power. The Court determined that the commissioners court had the
authority "to make a large number of decisions having a broad range
of impacts,", 46 and therefore, it must comply with the one-person-one-
vote principle. 147
Since Avery, a number of lawsuits based on the one-person-one-
vote principle have changed the structure of local governments. 148
These suits, stemming from claims of over- or under-representation,
have raised the issue of fair representation and have invalidated New
York City's Board of Estimate, 149 Chicago's school decentralization
plan, 5° the funding mechanism for Southern California's rapid transit
139. Cunningham v. Municipality of Metro. Seattle, 751 F. Supp. 885, 888 (W.D. Wash.
1990) (citing Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 30 (1849) (statement of counsel, Daniel
Webster)).
140. Id.
141. Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and Local Governments,
60 U. CHI. L. REv. 339, 342 (1993).
142. Cunningham, 751 F. Supp. at 887.
143. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
144. Id. at 482-83.
145. Id. at 483.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 484-85.
148. Briffault, supra note 141, at 405.
149. Board of Estimate of N.Y. v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989).
150. Fumarolo v. Chicago Bd. of Ed., 566 N.E.2d 1283 (I11. 990).
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system,15' and the regional government of the Seattle metropolitan
area. 152
In Cunningham v. Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle,'53 the
plaintiffs, registered voters in King County Washington, challenged
the constitutionality of the method by which the governing council of
the Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle (Metro) was selected.'
United States District Court Judge William Dwyer held that Metro
was subject to the constitutional one-person-one-vote principle and
that its selection process was illegal.'55
The one-person-one-vote principle applied in Cunningham
should apply to associations of government officials or agencies as dis-
cussed in Telford. In Telford, WSAC and WACO collected dues
from member counties based on their population. 56 There is, how-
ever, no discussion in the Telford case files as to whether the decisions
made by WSAC and WACO on how to spend those public funds
were made by county officials in votes based on the same population
ratios as the counties they represented. If a taxpayer citizen in one
county can have his or her taxes used in ways that do not reflect one-
person-one-vote principles, does this raise a constitutional question?
At what level of spending does the one-person-one-vote principle
apply? Should the principle apply whenever dues are based on popu-
lation? What if dues are spent on lobbying matters those citizens
oppose? Does this raise First Amendment concerns as well? How can
WSAC use taxpayer funds to oppose a citizens' initiative without vio-
lating First Amendment rights, particularly if one-person-one-vote
principles are not in place?
In sum, it cannot be determined from the record in the Telford
case how the county officials who control WSAC and WACO deter-
mined to spend taxpayer funds. This lack of open public information
demonstrates the inability of the public to hold these associations of
public officials accountable for their decisions, thus undermining rep-
resentative democracy. If citizens disagree with the activities of asso-
ciations, who do they hold accountable in the next election, and will
their votes be equally weighed?
151. Southern California Rapid Transit Dist. v. Bolen, 269 Cal. Rptr. 147 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990), rev'd, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843 (Cal. 1992).
152. Cunningham v. Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, 751 F. Supp. 885.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 887.
155. Id. at 895.
156. Telford v. Thurston County Bd. of Comm'rs, 95 Wash. App. 149, 155, 974 P.2d 886,
890 (1999).
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IV. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
This section will briefly examine whether the Washington State
Legislature has delegated too much power to associations of officials
and agencies. The legislature has already attempted to statutorily re-
form WASC and WACO;" 7 WSAC and WACO have ignored these
actions."' This response raises substantial questions about the delega-
tion of government power and money to associations who act and
argue as if they are immune from public control. Therefore, the ques-
tion becomes whether the legislature has allowed a delegation of too
much of its power and whether it should (1) restrict associations of
government officials or agencies to narrowly defined, nondiscretionary
information activities, and (2) open these associations to more effective
public disclosure requirements such as could be provided in an Inter-
net sunshine in government act.
A. Legislative Restrictions
In 1996, Paul Telford attempted to pass a bill in the Washington
State Legislature restricting associations like WSAC and WACO.
The proposed bill rendered any public association receiving twenty-
five percent or more of its revenue from dues subject to the PDA.
The house eventually dropped the bill. However, Senator McCaslin
introduced the bill to the Senate,'59 and it passed in 1997. While the
bill was being deliberated in the Senate, Mr. Telford tried for two
months to meet with the Governor to discuss the bill. Ironically, Mr.
Telford was invited to speak with a representative of the Governor the
same day the Governor vetoed the Senate Bill.' 60
Alternatively, the state legislature could prohibit all associations
controlled by government officials or agencies from spending any
funds on lobbying of any type, expressly subjecting those public asso-
ciations to the Open Records portion of the PDA and Open Public
Meetings Act and imposing fines on public associations that violate
157. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.47.070 (1998).
It is the desire of the legislature that he Washington State Association of County Offi-
cials, as set forth in chapter 36.47 RCW and the Washington State Association of
Counties, as set forth in RCW 36.32.350, shall merge into one association of elected
county officers. Only one association shall carry out the duties imposed by RCW
36.32.335 through 36.32.360 and RCW 36.47.020 through 36.47.060.
Id.
158. Telford v. Thurston County Bd. of Comm'rs, No. 96-2-04116-2, at 27, n.71 (Wash.
Supr. Ct. Thurston County, Oct. 29, 1997) (mem.). (In 1977, the Legislature directed WSAC
and WACO to merge into one organization pursuant to RCW § 36.47.070 "Merger of state
association of county officials with state association of counties.").
159. S.B. 5460, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1997).
160. Telephone interview with Paul Telford (Mar. 13, 2000).
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the statutes. The state legislature should initiate oversight hearings to
explore the extent of association activities and require annual reports
and state audits that would be fully open to public inspection.
Another proposed legislative restriction is the establishment of a
"Legislative Responsibility Act." This act, similar to the Congres-
sional Responsibility Act, proposed by New York Law School's Pro-
fessor David Schoenbrod, would prohibit the legislature (or Congress)
from drafting vaguely worded laws, and would hold the legislature
accountable for the results of its laws rather than permitting the legis-
lature to pass the buck (and the accountability) to an agency. 16
1
B. The Internet Sunshine in Government Proposal
With current technology, people are able to stay informed and
connected with the click of a mouse button. The Internet provides a
cheap, fast, and reliable way to access information on any topic from
anywhere in the world. The creation of an Internet Sunshine Act
would be a useful tool in effectuating the existing Sunshine Laws of
the Public Disclosure Act and Open Meeting Law.
All government organizations and most public associations are
already equipped with homepages detailing their organizations. It
would be a relatively simple matter to post meeting agendas, minutes
of meetings, voting records of members, budgets, and other informa-
tion on the Internet. Information request links should be set up on
homepages to ensure that every citizen has immediate access to infor-
mation regarding how his or her tax money is spent.
V. CONCLUSION
Associations of government officials and agencies should be sub-
ject to the same laws and constitutional constraints as individual
officials and agencies. This will ensure public accountability. If asso-
ciations are controlled by the public sector and affect public policy,
they are agents of the government. Associations such as WSAC and
WACO act as agents and must be subject to the scrutiny of the public
and must remain accountable to the public. The Telford decision,
while focusing specifically on Washington State's Public Disclosure
Act, should be read broadly, subjecting shadow governments, or Tel-
161. John J. Fialka, Professor Wants Congress to Clean Up Its Act, WALL ST. J., May 20,
1999, at B14. Congress's vaguely worded delegations, Mr. Schoenbrod now believes, "have
turned environmental laws into mass wishing" that actually endangers the environment because
it invites delays and leaves Congress unaccountable for results." Id. David Schoenbrod claims
that Congress uses delegation precisely for the purpose of avoiding responsibility for hard
choices. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine for
the Administrative State, 109 YALE. L. J. 1399, 1406 (2000).
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ford-type public associations, to the sunlight of public accountability.
Holding Telford-type associations accountable to all Sunshine Laws
and creating new tools to effectuate those laws (Internet sunshine law)
will ensure public accountability, which is the foundation for public
trust and confidence-the bedrock of our republican system of repre-
sentative government.
VI. EPILOGUE
Five years ago Paul Telford requested the Washington State
Attorney General to help him enforce the state's Public Disclosure
Act against two associations of state government officials-The
Washington State Association of Counties and the Washington Asso-
ciation of County Officials.
Four years ago, having been turned down by the State Attorney
General's office, Mr. Telford sued the associations to enforce the Pub-
lic Disclosure Act himself. He prevailed on summary judgment in
superior court.
The associations of government officials continued to resist Mr.
Telford and appealed. After another two years, Mr. Telford again
prevailed in a unanimous decision in the Washington State Court of
Appeals.
The court of appeals found that WSAC and WACO "serve a
public purpose, are publicly funded, are run by government officials,
and were created by government officials." '162 All in all, "their essen-
tial functions and attributes are those of a public agency."' 63 They act
as agents for government officials, using taxpayer funds.
In 2000, Mr. Telford filed a Public Disclosure Act request to
find out how much of the public's money was spent to resist his efforts
to enforce the Public Disclosure Act against WSAC and WACO.164
WSAC and WACO spent significant amounts of taxpayer funds to
oppose the application of the PDA to its actions. The use of such
money is itself subject to the criticism that the public needs more
control over such associations. WACO refused Mr. Telford's re-
quest, stating that "the Public Disclosure Act does not apply to
WACO. 6 ' WSAC refused with the same conclusion.166 Mr. Telford
stated, "This will all lead back to court; I'm discouraged."' 67
162. Telford v. Thurston County Bd. of Comm'rs, 95 Wash. App. 149, 165, 974 P.2d 886,
895 (1999).
163. Id. at 163-64, 974 P.2d at 894.
164. Telephone interview with Paul Telford, (Mar. 16, 2000).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. Letter from Paul Telford to author (March 19, 2000) (on file with the Seattle
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University Law Review). Mr. Telford has filed suit against WSAC/WACO for refusing to com-
ply with the PDA. The file number of the lawsuit is Thurston County No. 00-2-01122 6. Mr.
Telford wrote:
I received a letter from WSAC. It has the usual disclaimer that the PDA doesn't
apply but also says they spent $13,722.41 in attorney fees 'from Superior Court but I
wouldn't put it past them to twist the wording. This seems a little low to me consid-
ering all the briefing, hearings and motions. Plus $7500 to me. One can safely
assume that that WACO put up the same amount. So, total WSAC and WACO
litigation costs would be $42,444 (at least). Thurston County also spent Dep. Prose-
cutors time on their part. I would doubt if they keep track of man hours spent on this
case. And, it is still in litigation. Paul Telford.
